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NOTES
LAWYERS TAKE HEED! A DE NOVO REVIEW OF
RULE 11 IN NORTH CAROLINA-Turner v. Duke Univ.
INTRODUCTION
Only six years ago few lawyers mentioned Rule 11.1 Today,
federal Rule 11 "has produced over 1000 suits,"2 as well as a
"flurry of academic commentary." 3 Congress amended federal Rule
11 in 1983 to serve the courts as a strengthened tool to fight litiga-
tion abuses.4 In 1987, North Carolina followed the federal lead by
enacting a tougher rule to deter abusive practices in the state
courts. North Carolina is now beginning to confront some of the
problems which the federal courts have dealt with for several
years.' And the controversy will continue.
In Turner v. Duke Univ., the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted a de novo standard of appellate review7 in evaluating a
1. See Comment, Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions In The Seventh
Circuit, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 91, 96 (1988).
2. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach To Rule 11, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1988).
3. Id. See also Judge Schwartzer's Progeny: Schwartzer, Sanctions Under
the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) and Scwartzer,
Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988)(articles discussing the reasons
for Rule 11 and the rule's evolution in the three year interim.); Vairo, Rule 11: A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988)(complete overview of Rule 11 and its
impact on litigation).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note and Vairo, supra note 3,
at 193.
5. Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 160, 381 S.E.2d 706, 713 (1989) See
infra note 89 for text of amended Rule 11.
6. Id. at 152, 381 S.E.2d at 706.
7. "A common meaning of de novo may have the reviewing court in essence
retrying the entire case." De novo review is also known by such terms as "...
free, independent, full, plenary, [a review] of no particular deference, or an inde-
pendent conclusion on the record." 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, Standards of Review
§ 2.14 (1986). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of the United States 466
U.S. 485 (1984) ("when the court has a full review of a legal issue, it has no license
to venture freely into other issues of fact or the case as a whole.") Id. See gener-
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trial court's decision to impose or deny sanctions under Rule 11.8
However, the court did not reveal its rationale for the standard it
adopted.9 In contrast, the majority of federal circuits has adopted
an abuse of discretion standard.10 These courts have generally held
that a deferential standard best effectuates the purposes of Rule
11.11
The standard of review of a Rule 11 decision should effectuate
the purposes of the rule, which are to deter abusive practices and
to streamline the litigation process.12 At the same time however,
the standard should preserve zealous advocacy.13 This Note will
propose the standard of review which best balances both concerns.
First, this Note will summarize the facts of Turner, to introduce
the setting of the Rule 11 decision. Second, in the Background sec-
tion, this Note will explore the history of Rule 11 in the federal
courts and in North Carolina, and the various standards of review
adopted in the federal courts. Third, this Note will analyze the
Turner decision and the standard of appellate review adopted by
the North Carolina Supreme Court. Fourth, this Note will compare
the standards of review and suggest which of the standards fur-
thers or hinders the purposes of Rule 11. Through this Note, the
reader should have a sharper understanding of Rule 11, and its
treatment in the federal courts and in North Carolina. Finally, this
Note urges the reader to consider the impact which a particular
standard of review may have on a decision under Rule 11 and on
litigation generally.
THE CASE
On July 25, 1985, Jane L. Turner's husband sued Duke Uni-
versity Medical Center alleging the wrongful death of his wife.14
Mr. Turner also sued the Private Diagnostic Clinic and Dr. Alan
H. Friedman, alleging that the defendants' negligence had proxi-
mately caused his wife's death.15 During pretrial discovery, plain-
ally, inf,'a note 94 for definition of "standard of review."
8. Turner 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
9. See Id. at 162-65, 381 S.E.2d at 712-14.
10. See cases cited infra note 97.
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note and cases cited infra
note 97.
12. Id.
13. Vairo, supra note 3 at 226.
14. Turner, 325 N.C. at 154, 381 S.E.2d at 708.
15. Id. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 709. (Plaintiff alleged that defendants had failed
[Vol. 12:293
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tiff's counsel submitted his second set of interrogatories to defend-
ant Duke. 6 Interrogatory number 13 requested Duke to identify
any person who had knowledge of Mrs. Turner's treatment while
at the hospital and for the substance of that knowledge. 17 Interro-
gatory number 13 further asked for the address, telephone number
and job title of the individual identified. 8 Duke answered the in-
terrogatory by referring the plaintiff to the medical records which
had previously been provided to him. 9
In an effort to have defendant answer the question more spe-
cifically, plaintiff moved to compel Duke to answer interrogatory
number 13.20 Plaintiff requested defendant Duke to answer the
question directly, rather than answering by reference to the medi-
cal records.2 On August 6, 1986, the trial judge ordered the de-
fendants ". . .to provide the name, address and telephone number
as to specific individuals if requested by plaintiff's counsel at a
later date."22 Ten months later in a written request, plaintiff again
asked Duke for the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
the witnesses who had cared for Mrs. Turner during her hospitali-
zation.23 Duke did not respond.2 4 On June 4, 1987, the trial court
instructed all parties to supplement outstanding interrogatories by
July 1, 1987.25 In a letter dated July 1, 1987, Duke responded to
plaintiff's counsel, listing several witnesses by name.26 One of the
witnesses listed was Dr. Havard.2 7 In this letter, the defendant in-
cluded no other information about Dr. Havard.28
On July 6, 1987, Duke noticed the depositions of two witnesses
by hand-delivering a letter to plaintiff's counsel.29 The first notice
scheduled the deposition of Dr. Robert Havard in California on
to diagnose and treat his wife's perforated colon.)
16. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Turner v. Duke Univ., 91 N.C. App. 446, 450, 372 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1988),
rev'd and remanded, 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989).
23. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d at 714-15.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
1990]
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July 21, 1987.30 Dr. Manard was an oncology fellow who had seen
Mrs. Turner at Duke."' The second notice scheduled the deposi-
tion of Dr. R. P. Scheerer in Florida for July 23, 1987." Dr.
Scheerer was an oncologist who had treated Mrs. Turner's cancer
in Florida in 1982.11 These depositions were scheduled within a
week of the first day of trial.,4 Dr. Havard's deposition was sched-
uled 6 days before trial; Dr. Scheerer's, 4 days before trial.3 5
Prior to trial on July 17, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion for sanc-
tions pursuant to N.C. Gen Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 11(a), 26(g) and
37 .6 In essence, plaintiff alleged that Duke had failed to obey the
discovery order and that the defendant had noticed the deposi-
tions for an improper purpose.37 The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion in its entirety." The court of appeals reviewed the case
under a standard of clear error and affirmed.39
In Turner, the supreme court reversed the lower court and
held that a de novo review should be implemented in reviewing the
denial or granting of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.40 The court
further held that sanctions should have been imposed on Duke.4
30. Id. at 166-67, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
31. Order of Sanctions at 4, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d
706 (1989) (No. 85 CVS 01927).
32. Turner, 325 N.C. at 166-67, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
33. Order of Sanctions at 4, Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d
706 (1989) (No. 85 CVS 01927).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 453, 372 S.E.2d at 325. The plaintiff appealed
contending that the court of appeals erred in its review of the Rule 11 decision.
He contended that the appellate court incorrectly used an abuse of discretion
standard and urged the court to adopt a de novo review. The supreme court, how-
ever, correctly noted that the court of appeals used a standard of clear error. Tur-
ner, 325 N.C. at 162, 381 S.E.2d at 712. Research has found no jurisdiction using a
clearly crroneous standard of appellate review of decisions under Rule 11.
40. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 171, 381 S.E.2d at 714, 717-18. The court also
held that the court of appeals erred in affirming the directed verdict of Dr. Fried-
man and the Private Diagnostic Clinic. The supreme court found that the plain-
tiff presented sufficient evidence to have the alleged negligence of these defend-
ants decided by a jury. Id. at 162, 381 S.E.2d at 172. The issue of defendant
Duke's liability had been presented to the jury in the trial court. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of Duke. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 447, 371 S.E.2d at 321,
322.
41. Turner, 325 NC at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717-18.
[Vol. 12:293
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The court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to impose
Rule 11 sanctions on defendant Duke and/or Duke's counsel.42
BACKGROUND
North Carolina's Rule 11 has followed the evolution of the
federal Rule 11.4- Thus, an analysis of the federal cases will serve
to enlighten the history of Rule 11 in North Carolina.44
A. The Original Rule 11: A Failed Endeavor
Congress enacted the first federal Rule 1141 in 1938 as a result
42. On remand, in October of 1984, Judge Hobgood of The Superior Court of
Durham County took heed of the supreme court's message. Essentially, he or-
dered a three-part sanction under Rule l1(a). First, he required Beth A. Fleish-
man, attorney for Duke, to pay $6,445.00 to Leonard T. Jernigan, Jr., attorney for
plaintiff. The amount ordered represented compensation to the attorney. The
judge found that plaintiff's counsel had accrued 64.45 hours, at a rate of $100.00
per hour, directly attributable to the motion for sanctions. Second, the judge or-
dered the depositions of Drs. Havard and Scheerer stricken from evidence at any
subsequent trial. Finally, Judge Hobgood held that plaintiff was entitled to a new
trial against Duke. The judge stressed the prejudice which plaintiff suffered
through the testimony of Dr. Havard. In concluding, the judge stated that the
monetary sanctions imposed upon Fleishman would serve to deter and educate
her. He also added that no official censure or public reprimand was necessary to
accomplish this deterrence and education. Order of Sanctions at 8, 9, Turner v.
Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989) (NO. 85 CVS 01927).
43. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164, 381 S.E.2d at 713 (citing Sutton v. Duke, 277
N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970) (The federal rules of civil procedure have guided
the North Carolina courts in interpreting the state rules of civil procedure.)).
44. Id.
45. The original federal Rule 11 provides:
Signing of Pleadings
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or by statute, pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The sig-
nature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
that there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with an intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful
1990]
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of judge, lawyer and public concern about the growing "cost, com-
plexity, and burdensomeness of civil litigation."' 6 In its original
form, lawyers and judges rarely mentioned the rule. 7 Researchers
discovered only forty Rule 11 decisions prior to 1983.48 Though the
federal courts expressed concern about civil litigation abuses,
judges and lawyers neglected Rule 11.41 There were two primary
reasons for this neglect.50 First, the courts could sanction only will-
ful violations under the subjective standard of good faith." Sec-
ond, the court's only express power under the rule was the striking
of pleadings.2 In addressing the neglect of Rule 11, the Advisory
Committee stated that the original rule was an ineffective tool to
deter litigation abuses because of the confusion it created.5 3 The
original Rule 11 caused confusion primarily in three areas.5 4 First,
judges and lawyers were unsure about when to invoke the rule.55
Second, it was difficult to determine the standard of conduct re-
quired by the rule. 6 Third, judges felt constrained in imposing
sanctions because of the limited selection of sanctions under the
rule.5
Similarly, North Carolina courts rarely invoked the state's
original Rule 11. North Carolina's original Rule 11(a) allowed the
striking of pleadings, but unlike its federal counterpart, did not
authorize sanctions. 8 Estrada v. Burnham59 is the only case in
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disci-
plinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted. (Emphasis added.)
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. (1938).
46. Schwartzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985).
47. Comment, The Horizon of Rule 11: Toward A Guided Approach To
Sanctions, 26 Hous. L. REV. 535 (1989).
48. Id. at 535, n.4.
49. Id. at 535.
50. Vairo, supra note 3, at 191.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
54. Vairo, supra note 3, at 191.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. North Carolina's original Rule 11 provides:
(a) Signing by attorney. - Every pleading of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his indi-
vidual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
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which the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the original
Rule 11 in depth. The case illustrates the limitation in the original
rule's sanctioning power." In Estrada, the plaintiff filed a medical
negligence complaint one day before the statute of limitations
tolled.6 1 The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his suit only min-
utes after filing the complaint.62 The plaintiff admitted that it was
his objective to obtain the one-year extension to refile his case as
allowed under Rule 41(a)(1).11 On appellate review, the supreme
court rejected plaintiff's argument, that his pleading was in accord
with the spirit and letter of Rule 11(a), and dismissed the com-
plaint as sham." Estrada was the exception however, and as in the
original federal rule, North Carolina's Rule 11(a) fell largely into
neglect.
B. The Amended Federal Rule 11: A Powerful Weapon Against
Abuse
The watershed year of 1983 brought forth an integrated pack-
age of civil rules designed to combat litigation abuses in the federal
courts.6 5 Rule 11, as amended,"6 was a large gun in this artillery. It
sented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Ex-
cept when otherwise specifically provided by these rules or by statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature
of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the plead-
ing; that to the best of his information, knowledge, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
the rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may pro-
ceed as though the pleading had not been served. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a)(Cum. Supp. 1983)(amended 1987).
59. Estrada v. Burnham, 316 N.C. 318, 341 S.E.2d 538 (1986).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 319, 341 S.E.2d 538.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 322, 341 S.E.2d at 542.
64. Id. at 325, 341 S.E.2d at 543.
65. Vairo, supra note 3, at 193; Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended in 1983 to combat the problem of abusive litiga-
tion in the federal courts. Id.
66. Rule 11 as amended in 1983 provides:
Signing of Pleadings, Motions and
other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his indi-
vidual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
1990]
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was designed to prevent the delay and increasing costs of modern
civil litigation in the federal courts.6 7 Additionally, the drafters in-
tended the rule to "discourage dilatory and abusive tactics and to
.. .streamline the litigation process. '"68
The amended Rule 11 imposes significant duties on attorneys,
parties and pro se litigants.69 First, the rule requires that the attor-
ney or pro se litigant sign the pleading, motion or other paper. 7
This signature certifies that the signor is in compliance with Rule
11. 7' Second, the amended rule requires the paper to be: 1) well-
grounded in fact; 2) warranted by existing law, or a good faith ar-
gument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law;
and 3) not interposed for an improper purpose.
Importantly, the courts also gained additional power to en-
force the duties imposed under the amended Rule 11. 73 First, the
sented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and
state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The
rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be over-
come by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both an appropriate sanc-
tion, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(Emphasis added.)
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
67. Vairo, supra note 3, at 190.
68. FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
69. See Scwartzer, supra note 46, at 181.
70. Id. at 185.
71. Id.
72. Comment, supra note 1, at 100.
73. Vairo, supra note 3, at 193.
(Vol. 12:293
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court must objectively evaluate an attorney's conduct. 74 It is much
easier for the court to evaluate conduct objectively, rather than
struggle under the former bad faith or willful test.75 Second, under
the amended rule, the court can raise the Rule 11 violation sua
sponte.76 Third, if the court finds a violation of the reasonable
standard of conduct, as required by the amended Rule 11, it has a
mandatory duty to impose sanctions on the offender." Finally, the
amended Rule 11 allows the court discretion in shaping an appro-
priate sanction in accord with the type of violation committed.78
In summary, the amended federal Rule 11 demands two duties
to deter litigation abuses and to streamline the civil litigation pro-
cess. 79 First, judges are required to become more involved in super-
vising litigation, "with an eye toward earlier pre-trial disposi-
tion."80 Second, lawyers are to take responsibility for their actions
in court and are no longer allowed to act as "narrow-minded
adversaries."'"
In retrospect, it is humorous that the Advisory Committee
feared that the amended Rule 11 would lie as weak and dormant as
its predecessor.82 The Committee also feared that the rule would
be overused.83 Needless to say, it is the latter fear that has become
the focus of much controversy.8 ' Rule 11 has spawned excessive
satellite litigation. 5 As of 1988, only five years after Rule 11 was
74. Id. See supra note 66, language of amended rule: "formed after reasona-
ble inquiry. ..".
75. Vairo, supra note 3, at 193.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 190.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 195 (discussing the remarks of Professor Arthur Miller, Reporter to
the Advisory Committee, Federal Bar Council Annual Winter Meeting (February
1987)).
83. Id.
84. See generally Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary
Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REv 7 (1987)(discussing the
necessity of sanctions in modern litigation); Untereiner, supra note 2 (discussing
the evolution of Rule 11 and its impact on litigation today); Battey, Rule 11 Sanc-
tions: Some Current Observations, 33 S.D.L. REv. 207 (1988)(discussing cases ap-
plying various sanctioning methods to control litigation abuses.).
85. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 232-33. "Indeed, many have said that Rule 11
has replaced civil RICO actions as the cottage industry of the litigation bar." Id.
at 199.
1990]
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amended, researchers found over 1000 reported Rule 11 decisions
in the federal courts. 6 Critics of the rule focus on this avalanche of
litigation and continue to allege that the rule chills zealous advo-
cacy.8 7 Others urge the courts to channel enforcement of Rule 11
toward the purposes for which the rule was enacted.88
C. North Carolina's Amended Rule 11
With the federal rule as its guide, on January 1, 1987, North
Carolina adopted the new, improved Rule 11.89 Rule 11(a) in North
Carolina embraces the same three-prong test as the federal rule.90
Thus, North Carolina courts must sanction conduct which is found
to be:(1) Without factual basis, (2) without a legal basis, or (3)
without a proper purpose." It is reasonable to speculate that, as
has occurred with the federal rule, increased satellite litigation
may result. As the case law develops, North Carolina courts will
86. Comment, supra note 1, at 93 and Untereiner, supra note 2, at 901.
87. Schwartzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988).
88. Id.
89. North Carolina's Rule 11, as amended in 1987, provides:
Rule 11. Signing and verification of pleadings.
(a) Signing by attorney - Every pleading, motion or other paper of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a cer-
tificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or increase in the cost of liti-
gation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. GEN STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a)(Cum. Supp. 1989).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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need to define the boundaries and fill in the gaps of Rule 11. As
the courts decide the issues of Rule 11, they should primarily re-
member the goals of the rule: to deter abusive practices and to
streamline the litigation process.2 The North Carolina Supreme
Court began to define the boundaries of Rule 11 in Turner v. Duke
Univ. 3
D. The Standard of Review of Rule 11"'
One of the many issues adjudicated under Rule 11 relates to
appellate review. Courts have had to determine the appropriate
standard of appellate review when the trial court imposed or failed
to impose sanctions. The vast majority of states has yet to confront
this issue. 5 The federal courts, however, have diverged into three
different camps, each purporting to best accomplish the purposes
of Rule 11. 6 A survey of the various standards will aid the reader
in understanding the standard of review adopted by the Turner
court and the impact of the standard adopted.
1. Abuse of Discretion-Across the Board
Seven circuits have adopted an abuse of discretion standard of
appellate review in analyzing Rule 11 decisions. The First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth circuits have adopted this
92. See Scwartzer, supra note 87, at 1013.
93. Turner, 325 N.C. at 162, 381 S.E.2d at 712.
94. "Standard of review" is defined as "the degree of deference given by the
reviewing court to the actions or decisions under review." Standards of review are
" .those yardstick phrases meant to guide the appellate court in approaching
the issue and parties before it and the trial court's earlier procedure or result."
Standards of review ". . .actually do affect subsequent courts, trial and appellate
procedure in doing their job." Childress & Davis, supra note 7, at § 1.1.
95. As of December 1989, only 6 states had adopted a standard of appellate
review for the amended Rule 11. See Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381
S.E.2d 152 (1989) (adopted a de novo standard of review in Rule 11 decisions);
Cooper v. Viking Ventures, 53 Wash. App. 739, 770 P.2d 659 (1989) (adopted an
abuse of discretion standard); Wright v. Hills, 161 Ariz. 583, 780 P.2d 416 (1989)
(three-tier analysis of appellate review); Clark Equipment Co. v. Bowman, 762
S.W.2d 417 (Ky. App. 1988) (three-tier standard of review); Mears Park Holding
Corp. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. App. 1988) (abuse of discre-
tion standard); Searight v. Cimino, 230 Mont. 96, 748 P.2d 948 (1988) (an abuse
of discretion standard of appellate review.)
96. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164-65, 381 S.E.2d at 713-14.
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deferential standard of appellate review. 7 The primary justifica-
tion expressed for this view is the commitment to the trial judge's
unique experience and position.9 8 The trial judge has "tasted the
flavor of the litigation" and has interacted with the parties.9 He is
therefore, in the best position to make the judgment about
whether a lawyer "went too far."1 °
The Seventh Circuit met en banc in Mars Steel Corp. v. Con-
tinental Bank.' The court sought to resolve the inner circuit con-
flict concerning the appropriate standard of appellate review under
Rule 11.102 The court chose an abuse of discretion standard of ap-
pellate review, basing its decision on a three-pronged rationale.10 3
First, the court analogized an attorney's duty under Rule 11 to tort
law, which also employs a deferential standard of appellate re-
view.1 " Second, the Seventh Circuit found the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Pierce v. Underwood influential. 10 5 And
third, an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review avoids
the confusion that can result from a less deferential standard.'06
First, the court explained that Rule 11 is analogous to tort
law, thus establishing a "new form of negligence (legal malprac-
tice).'1 0 7 Rule 11 "creates duties to one's adversary, as well as to
the legal system, just as tort law creates duties to one's client."' 10 8
In tort cases, a deferential standard is the usual standard of appel-
late review. 10 9 The court held that it only followed that a deferen-
tial standard should be employed in the "fact-intensive disputes"
97. See, Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 932-37 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en banc); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1989); Kale
v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 756-58 (1st Cir. 1988); Teamsters v. Cement
Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836
F.2d 866, 871-73 (5th Cir. 1988)(en banc); Century Products, Inc. v. Sutter, 837
F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1988); Stevens v. Lawyer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d
1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986).
98. See generally Id.
99. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
100. Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 933.
101. Id. at 928.
102. Id. at 930.
103. Id. at 930-37.
104. Id. at 932.
105. Id. at 934-35.
106. Id. at 934-36.
107. Id. at 932.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 933.
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under Rule 11."10
The court's second reason for adopting an abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing decisions under Rule 11 was based upon
Pierce v. Underwood.' In Pierce, the United States Supreme
Court attempted to flesh out the appropriate standard of review
under the Equal Access to Judgment Act.1 2 In adopting a deferen-
tial standard, the Supreme Court stated that the energy to be in-
vested by an appellate court undertaking a de novo review would
not clarify the law." 3 Additionally, the Court believed that a de
novo review of legal questions may "strangely distort the appellate
process.""" The Supreme Court summarized that the appropriate
review could be best achieved by the appellate court acting as
such, thereby not attempting to act as a trial court."'
The Ninth Circuit's third reason for adopting a deferential
standard was based upon avoiding confusion in the district
courts." 6 The Mars Steel court explained that a de novo review
would fail to clarify the law and would only result in encouraging
confusion as to defining the boundaries of appropriate conduct. 1 7
"Fact-bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through appel-
late review, de novo or otherwise.""18 In its conclusion, the court
reaffirmed its commitment to the spirit of Rule 11.1" The court
admonished trial judges to foster the purposes of the rule by "re-
flecting seriously and considering fully before granting or denying
sanctions."' 20
110. Id. at 933.
111. Id. at 934. See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, (1988)
(holding that appellate courts should use an abuse of discretion standard of re-
view when evaluating decisions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)).
112. Mars Steel Corp. at 934-35.
113. Id. at 935.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 936.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court further stated, "We can multiply the occasions for disa-
greement much more easily than we can bring harmony. Appellate confusion is
worse: counsel and district judges must spend time trying to harmonize our opin-
ions. This is one of the reasons why case-specific decisions should be made on a
deferential standard. The judgment of three appellate judges is not necessarily
better than the judgment of one district judge, but it is assuredly more costly to
obtain and interpret." Id. at 936.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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2. The Three-Tier Standard of Review
The Ninth Circuit alone has adopted the three-tier standard
of appellate review for decisions under Rule 11.121 Under the three-
tier analysis, the court (1) reviews the factual determinations of
the lower court under a clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviews the
legal conclusions under a de novo standard; and (3) reviews the
choice of sanction under an abuse of discretion standard.12 2 As a
minority of one, the Ninth Circuit's approach has suffered two ba-
sic criticisms.1 2 3 First, the standard is difficult to apply to Rule 11
decisions which are a complex mix of fact and law.124 Second, the
three tier-standard has been described as "intrusive" by the Fifth
Circuit.1 25 Many courts share the sentiment of the Fifth Circuit
and state that the trial judge should have the "lion's share" of the
responsibility for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 26
3. The Combination Standard of Review
Three of the circuit courts apply a third standard of appellate
review in analyzing Rule 11 decisions. 27 The Second, Eleventh and
D.C. Circuits employ a combination of de novo and abuse of dis-
cretion standards to evaluate the trial court's decision to impose or
deny sanctions under Rule 11.128 First, these circuits review the
factual findings and the particular sanction chosen by the lower
court under an abuse of discretion standard.'29 Second, the courts
apply a de novo review to assess the legal sufficiency of a pleading
121. Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). The
Turner court reported the Seventh Circuit as also subscribing to the three-tier
approach. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 713 (citing Brown v. Federation
of State Medical Bds. of United States, 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987) as authority
for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit subscribed to the three-tier ap-
proach). However, Brown was reversed by the Seventh Circuit en banc in Mars
Steel Corp. 880 F.2d at 930. Both Mars Steel Corp. and Turner were decided in
July, 1989.
122. Zalvidar, 780 F.2d at 828.
123. See generally Kale, 861 F.2d at 758.
124. Id.
125. Vairo, supra note 3, at 225-26 (quoting Schivangi v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds Inc., 825 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1987)).
126. See supra, note 97.
127. See generally Eastway Constr. Corp., v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, (1987); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551 (11th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
128. Id.
129. Turner, 325 N.C. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 713-14.
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or motion and the trial court's decision to impose sanctions.13
The early Rule 11 decisions inferred this de novo authority
from the language of the rule itself.131 Rule 11 states, ". . . the
court . . . shall impose . . . an appropriate sanction. .. ,132 Some
courts have interpreted the "shall" language, combined with the
objective standard of conduct as required by the rule, to mean that
the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to
determine a Rule 11 violation.1 33
More recent cases, however have rejected this theory.134 These
courts state that the mandatory language does not prescribe the
relationship between the appellate and the trial judges. 1385 The
courts also criticize the de novo portion of this review as involving
appellate courts in trial court matters.136 Additionally, the courts
express concern that a de novo review will provide opportunity for
judicial disagreement at the appellate level. 137 Since one of the pri-
mary goals in the amendment of Rule 11 was to streamline litiga-
tion, it seems incongruous to encourage appeals through an oppor-
tunity for a de novo review. 138
Critics continue to urge appellate courts to adopt definitive
and uniform standards of appellate review in assessing decisions
under Rule 11.139 In adopting a standard of review, an appellate
court should look to the purposes of Rule 11 for guidance in its
decision. 140 An appellate court has several interests to balance in
its decision to adopt a particular standard of review. First, the
court must consider the purposes of Rule 11: to deter abusive con-
duct and to streamline the litigation process.' The court must
also consider the autonomy of the trial judge, who is in a unique
position to reflect upon the "nuances" of the particular case in as-
130. Id.
131. Kale, 861 F.2d at 757-58.
132. See supra, note 66 for text of FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
133. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 757 (discussing Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d
at 254 n. 7 (subscribing to the proposition that the appellate court is in as good a
position as the trial court because of the objective standard of conduct required
by Rule 11)).
134. Kale, 861 F.2d at 757-58.
135. See Id.
136. Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 936.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 935.
139. Vairo, supra note 3, at 226.
140. Id.
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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sessing attorney conduct. 4"
ANALYSIS
In 1989, the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted the
amended Rule 11 for the first time in Turner v. Duke Univ.'4" The
trial court had denied plaintiffs motion for sanctions under Rule
11.1' The court of appeals affirmed this decision."1 5 The plaintiff
appealed to the supreme court alleging that the court of appeals
erred in using an abuse of discretion standard of review."' He
urged the supreme court to adopt a de novo standard. 147 In con-
trast, the defendant urged the court to adopt a standard which
would allow deference to the trial court's decision.", 8 First, the su-
preme court in Turner noted that the court of appeals had used
neither an abuse of discretion standard, nor a de novo standard." 9
The court of appeals had used a standard of "clearly erroneous."' 50
Second, the Turner court adopted a de novo standard of review,
allowing the trial court deference only in the particular sanction
chosen.' 5 1 The Turner court explained:
A trial court's decision to impose or not to impose mandatory
sanctions under Rule 11(a) is reviewable de novo as a legal issue.
In the de novo review, the appellate court will determine (1)
whether the trial court's conclusions of law support its judgment
or determination, (2) whether the trial court's conclusions of law
support its findings of fact, and (3) whether the findings of fact
are supported by a sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate
court makes these three determinations in the affirmative, it must
uphold the trial court's decision to impose or deny sanctions
under N.C. GEN. STAT. §1A-1, Rule 11(a). 52
As stated, the supreme court found that a deferential standard
was appropriate in deciding upon the particular sanction to be im-
142. In Re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1988).
143. Turner, 325 N.C. at 162, 381 S.E. 2d 712.
144. Id. at 157, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 162, 381 S.E.2d at 712.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 165, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
152. Id.
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posed." 3 A trial court would be reversed in its choice of sanction
only upon the appellate court finding an abuse of discretion."" In
the opinion, the court stated, " After careful analysis of the federal
decisions, we adopt. . .", but chose not to reveal its rationale in
deciding upon the de novo standard of appellate review.' 55 The
court did reveal, however, its reliance upon the imperative "shall
impose" language of Rule 11.356 The Turner court emphasized that
the rule's mandatory language implies that the trial court's discre-
tion should be "on the selection of an appropriate sanction, rather
than on a decision to impose sanctions.' ' 57
Using a de novo review, the court then analyzed the conduct
of Duke.'58 The court focused its attention on the trial court's
"conclusion of law" that Duke's conduct was not sanctionable
under Rule 11(a). 59 The plaintiff outlined four reasons that de-
fendant Duke's conduct warranted sanctions under Rule 11(a): (1)
that Duke failed to disclose Dr. Scheerer as an expert witness; (2)
that Duke failed to identify Dr. Havard in response to discovery
requests; (3) that the depositions were interposed to increase liti-
gation cost and to delay trial; and (4) that the depositions were
purposely interposed to disrupt plaintiff's counsel's preparation for
trial.'
The Turner court began its de novo review by analyzing plain-
tiff's first argument.' 6 ' The plaintiff argued that Dr. Scheerer was
an expert and that counsel for the' defense had failed to reveal him
as such." 2 Thus, plaintiff contended that Duke had failed to obey
an order of discovery requiring all expert witnesses to be identified
and deposed by July 1, 1987.163 The Turner court, however, found
the trial court to be correct on this issue.16 4 The supreme court
stated that Dr. Scheerer was acting as an ordinary witness, not in
his capacity as an expert.'6 5 The Turner court agreed with the trial
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 166-71, 381 S.E.2d at 714-18.
159. Id. at 166, 381 S.E.2d 770 F.2d at 714 (quoting Westmoreland, at 1174).
160. Turner, 325 N.C. at 167, 381 S.E.2d at 715.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 167-68, 381 S.E.2d at 715-16.
165. Id.
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court's decision that Dr. Scheerer had "personally treated the
plaintiff's wife", and that his deposition was scheduled to question
him about this treatment.1 66 Therefore, although physicians are ex-
perts in the field of medicine, here Dr. Scheerer acted as an ordi-
nary witness."6 7
In reviewing plaintiff's three remaining arguments, the Turner
court embraced its de novo review and rejected any deference to
the trial judge.6 8 In his second argument, plaintiff asserted that
Duke had failed to identify Dr. Havard in response to interro-
gatory number 13.169 During pretrial discovery, plaintiff requested
Duke to identify persons who had treated the plaintiff's wife dur-
ing her stay at Duke Hospital.17 Duke's attorney answered interro-
gatory number 13 by referring plaintiff to the medical records al-
ready provided. 7 1 Plaintiff then filed a motion to compel Duke to
answer the question more specifically. 17 In the order, the trial
judge sustained defendant's objection as to the broadness of the
question in interrogatory number 13.173 Nevertheless, he granted
plaintiff's motion in the following language: "[Als to interrogatory
No. 13, defendants are ordered to provide the name, address and
telephone number as to specific individuals if requested by plain-
tiff's counsel at a later date."' 74
Defendant argued and the trial court agreed that the language
of the order was ambiguous.'75 Therefore, when plaintiff made a
second general request asking for information about all of defend-
ant's witnesses, defendant did not answer the request.17 Duke's
attorney contended that his duty, according to the language of the
order, was to answer questions as to specific individuals if re-
quested by the plaintiff. 77
166. Id. at 168, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 714.
174. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 450, 372 S.E.2d at 323.
175. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
176. Id.
177. Id. One must question the wisdom in defense counsel's failure to answer
to plaintiff's request for information as to the witness' address, telephone number,
etc. Why is it that Duke did not object to plaintiff's discovery request, attach a
copy of the trial judge's order and explain to the plaintiff its interpretation of the
[Vol. 12:293
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The court of appeals agreed that the language of the order was
ambiguous.17 The lower court also thought it significant that
plaintiff "had only to ask specifically about the identity of each
signator and defendant would have been obliged to supply it."'1 9
Though defendant's counsel did identify Dr. Havard in a letter
dated July 1, 1987, the Turner court held that defendant's answer
to plaintiff's second general request violated the reasonable con-
duct standard of Rule 11(a).' 80
Despite acknowledging that the trial judge's order was ambig-
uous, the supreme court concluded that the defendant improperly
failed to comply with that order."8 1 The court believed that plain-
tiff's interpretation of the order was "more logical" than the de-
fendant's interpretation.'82 The Turner court interpreted the order
to mean that defendant should have answered the second request
specifically, even if asked about the witnesses in a general man-
ner.18 3 The supreme court stated that the order was more logically
interpreted as meaning "that Duke was directed to provide infor-
mation as to specific individuals whom Duke intended to present
as witnesses if requested to do so at a later date by plaintiff's
counsel. ' 8
An appellate court should not use the advantage of hindsight
in reviewing an attorney's conduct. 8 5 The Advisory Committee
warned,. . . "The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of
hindsight and should test the sigher's conduct by inquiring what
was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading was submit-
ted."' 86 The trial court, appellate court and the defense counsel
thought the language of the order ambiguous. 187 The supreme
court disagreed.' 88 Thus, given such a difference of opinion, reason-
able men could differ in their choice of action based on that opin-
ion. The standard of an attorney's conduct under Rule 11 is one of
order?
178. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 450, 372 S.E.2d at 323.
179. Id.
180. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169, 381 S.E.2d at 716.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
186. Id.
187. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 450, 372 S.E.2d at 323.
188. Turner, 325 N.C. at 168, 381 S,E.2d at 716.
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reasonableness under the circumstances.'s 9 It is not, however, a
standard of "more logical" action. 90 Given the harsh impact of
sanctions upon an attorney's reputation, a court should impose
sanctions only for improper, unreasonable conduct.'" In this case,
the supreme court seems to have effectuated a punishment for
choosing a less logical option, rather than deterrence of unreasona-
ble conduct.
The Turner court then turned to plaintiff's third argument,
that defense counsel's conduct "threatened a needless increase in
litigation costs and unnecessary delay."' 92 The Turner court agreed
with plaintiff's argument. 93 The court held that Dr. Scheerer's tes-
timony was duplicative of defendant's other expert witness, Dr.
Ozer."" Thus, the court concluded that Dr. Scheerer's testimony
needlessly threatened to increase plaintiff's litigation cost.195 In
contrast, the lower court emphasized the fact that Dr. Scheerer
had personally treated the patient. 96 The appellate court stated
that although the testimony of Dr. Scheerer and Dr. Ozer may
have overlapped in certain areas, "Dr. Scheerer's personal perspec-
tive and impressions were relevant and his testimony was not
needlessly duplicative."' 97
The testimony of witnesses is an incident of trial which is
uniquely intimate to a trial judge.'98 Thus, the trial court's opinion
that a witness' testimony is not duplicative should not be second
guessed by an appellate court.'99 This lack of deference to the trial
court's holding seems to be one of the specific instances in which
the Turner court failed to fulfill its role as an appellate court. The
trial judge has a "familiarity with the case, parties, and counsel
189. Turner, 325 N.C. at 164, 381 S.E.2d at 713.
190. Id. at 163-69, 381 S.E.2d at 713-16.
191. See generally Untereiner, supra note 2, at 918-19.
192. Turner, 325 N.C. at 169-71, 381 S.E.2d at 716-18.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
195. Id.
196. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 452-53, 372 S.E.2d at 324-25. The lower court
explained, "The record is devoid of any evidence that these depositions either
increased plaintiff's costs or were purposely scheduled to distract plaintiff from
preparing for trial .... Dr. Scheerer was the surgeon who operated on and
treated her cancer. We believe that his personal perspective and impression were
relevant and his deposition and testimony were not needlessly duplicative." Id.
197. Id.
198. Kale, 861 F.2d at 758.
199. Id.
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that an appellate court cannot have." 200 Particularly in evaluating
the appropriateness of witness testimony, a trial judge seems to
uniquely have "the view from the trenches. '20 1 Therefore, it should
be the trial judge's "exercise of judgement and discretion that is
the clearest guidepost to appellate courts."20 2
The supreme court further rejected Duke's argument and the
trial court's suggestion to conduct telephone depositions of the
doctors in California and Florida.203 The lower court suggested this
alternative to decrease plaintiff's cost in traveling to the distant
states.24 Arguably, if the plaintiff had agreed to telephone deposi-
tions, he would have had to invest little time or expense. The
plaintiff also specifically refused to move for a continuance. 20 5 The
Turner court concluded that the plaintiff's refusals of telephone
depositions and a continuance were reasonable because of two
facts.20 First, the court stated that the violation of Rule 11 "had
already taken place. ' 20 7 Second, the trial had already been twice
continued. 08 The Turner court chose to ignore the fact that the
trial judge had specifically asked the plaintiff if he would object to
the doctors' testimony at trial.209 Plaintiff responded, "[I]f they
want to fly them in, I suppose I would have no objection to
them. .. 210 Again, the supreme court rejected the proximity of
the trial judge and his experience with the practicalities of
litigation.
The Turner court surmised 'that the plaintiff's second and
third grounds were enough to constitute sanctionable conduct
under Rule 11(a). 21 1 The court stated that "Duke's noticing and
taking of the depositions of Dr. Havard and Dr. Scheerer so close
to trial, subsequent to the failure to reveal the existence of Dr.
Havard, as well as the duplicative nature of Dr. Scheerer's testi-
mony threatened to increase plaintiff's litigation costs and cause
200. Id. (quoting O'Connell v. Champion, 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987)).
201. Kale, 861 F.2d at 758.
202. Id.
203. Turner, 325 N.C. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 170-71, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Id.
210. Turner, 91 N.C. App. at 453, 372 S.E.2d at 325.
211. Turner, 325 N.C. at 170, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
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an unnecessary delay of the trial in violation of Rule 11(a)." ' The
court continued, however, to address plaintiff's fourth argument.213
He argued that the depositions were noticed to purposely disrupt
his preparation for trial. 14 In agreement, the court acknowledged
that the plaintiff would have been unable to adequately prepare
for trial if required to travel to California and Florida for deposi-
tions. 15 The supreme court then inferred that the depositions were
scheduled to harass the plaintiff's preparation for trial.2"' The
court, however, did not discuss any increased litigation costs, delay
or any other general or specific prejudice to the plaintiff.21 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Turner concluded by
reversing the court of appeals and remanding the case for the im-
position of mandatory sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(a).21 s
A. The Goals of Rule 11- To Deter Abusive Litigation Practices
According to the Advisory Committee's Note, Rule 11 was pri-
marily designed to deter abusive practices in modern civil litiga-
tion." 9 Thus, appellate courts should model their standards of ap-
pellate review to promote the primary goal of deterrence.2 2 The
Ninth Circuit held in Matter of Yagman that to deter improper
conduct, the trial judge should "monitor attorneys closely and tell
them at the time the offending conduct occurs." ' Finding a Rule
212. Id.
213. Id. at 170-71, 381 S.E.2d at 717.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See generally, Id. Further, Judge Scwartzer discussed the elements to
explore to assess whether a document has been "interposed for an improper pur-
pose": "The record in the case and all the circumstances should afford an ade-
quate basis for determining whether the particular papers or proceedings caused
delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in the cost of litigation
that was needless, or whether they lacked any apparent purpose." (Emphasis
added.) Scwartzer, supra note 46, at 195.
218. Turner, 325 N.C. at 171, 381 S.E.2d at 717-18. See supra note 42 (sanc-
tion imposed on attorney for Duke).
219. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
220. See generally Untereiner, supra note 2, at 907-09 (discusses deterrence
as primary overriding goal of sanctioning under Rule 11.)
221. Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1986), amended,
803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). There are those
who state that the primary goals of Rule 11 should be either compensation or
punishment. See generally Untereiner, supra note 2, at 907. See Eastway, 821
F.2d at 124-26 (Pratt, J. dissenting) and In Rr TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441. 446 (7th
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11 violation at the end of litigation fails to effectively achieve spe-
cific deterrence.222 In effect, a de novo review by an appellate
court, with the imposition of sanctions after an attorney's conduct
has been condoned by a trial court, effects a punishment rather
than deterrence.223
In Turner, the supreme court found Duke's conduct to be
sanctionable, after the conduct was found to be reasonable at the
trial and appellate levels.224 Thus, a de novo review of Rule 11
seems to punish improper conduct rather than to foster deterrence,
as recommended by the Advisory Committee's Note.225
A de novo appellate review of Rule 11 cases also raises the
issue of the distinct roles of the trial judge and the appellate
judge.226 To deter abusive conduct, one must be familiar with it.227
The trial judge is the judicial actor closest to the alleged miscon-
duct; therefore, the responsibility for imposing Rule 11 sanctions is
vested in him.22s The trial judge understands the practicalities of
everyday litigation.229 He alone "sees the shots fired by one party
against the other, and he alone has the full knowledge of the cir-
cumstances prompting the crossfire. '23 ° Similarly, in Turner, the
defense counsel's notices of depositions were only two papers in a
"blizzard ' 23 1 of documents in a complicated medical malpractice
trial. Only the trial judge could have possessed the practical expe-
rience to know the reasons or motives for defendant's conduct in
this discovery setting.232 The majority of circuits has concluded
that an abuse of discretion standard is the more appropriate appel-
late review.23 These courts have left the thoughtful determination
of reasonable conduct to the trial judge because "his familiarity
with the case, parties, and counsel is one an appellate court cannot
Cir. 1985) (compensation as a goal under Rule 11). But see Note, The Dynamics
of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Respon-
sibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 329 (1986)(punitive goal under Rule 11).
222. Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1183-84.
223. See generally supra note 221.
224. See Turner, 325 N.C. at 162-71, 381 S.E.2d at 712-18.
225. See generally FED. R. Civ. P 11 advisory committee's note.
226. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 758; Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 934.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Kale, 861 F.2d at 758.
231. Id.
232. See Id.
233. See supra note 97.
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have. ' 234 If the goal of Rule 11 is primarily deterrence, appellate
courts should admonish the trial judges to use their familiarity
with litigation to deter abusive practices as they occur.2 35
B. The Goals of Rule 11 : To Streamline the Litigation Process
The Advisory Committee's Note encourages courts to "stream-
line the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses"
through the use of Rule 11.236 Thus, courts must remember that as
they increase the amount or frequency of awards under Rule 11,
the number of motions for Rule 11 sanctions will increase. 237 If
Rule 11 develops into a fee-shifting device, it will defeat itself by
becoming the object of litigation abuses.2 8 Judge Weiss, who par-
ticipated as a member of the Advisory Committee, succinctly
stated, "Rule 11 has become the subject of abuse. . ." and he
"caution[ed] that Rule 11 is not to be used routinely." '239
Therefore, an appellate court should implement two policies to
foster the second purpose of Rule 11, to streamline the litigation
process.240 First, appellate courts should employ a standard of re-
view which will deter abusive litigation.2"1 Second, trial courts
should mold a sanction according to the conduct in question.242
An appellate court must carefully review a Rule 11 decision to
discourage abusive litigation practices. 243 A court however, should
not embrace a review which will encourage "satellite litigation" for
the shot at a de novo review.2 44 The Turner court, in adopting a de
novo standard of appellate review, may well be sending an invita-
tion to all parties to appeal a Rule 11 decision.245 The opportunity
to "get a de novo call on every close question" may be tempting if
234. O'Connell, 812 F.2d at 395. See generally supra note 97 (for cases which
emphasize the trial judge's advantage as more proximate to the conduct in
question.)
235. Id.
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
237. Vairo, supra note 3, at 231.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 204.
240. See generally Mars Steel Corp.. 880 F.2d at 935, Vairo, supra note 3, at
230.
241. Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 935.
242. Vairo, supra note 3, at 231.
243. Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 935.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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there is an opportunity to recover attorney's fees.24 6 In contrast, an
abuse of discretion standard will ensure reasonable conduct as re-
quired by Rule 11, but will decrease a temptation to appeal a de-
nial of sanctions by the trial court.2" 7 The Turner standard may
perpetuate excessive litigation in North Carolina courts. Thus, a de
novo standard of appellate review may cause the "streamlined liti-
gation" enhanced by Rule 11 to be "offset by the cost of satellite
litigation."248
The second measure a court should utilize to streamline litiga-
tion is the choice of an appropriate sanction.249 The trial court has
wide discretion in this area, but has a responsibility to effectuate
the purposes of Rule 11.250 Sanctions should be molded in accord
with the particular facts and circumstances of each case.251 Judges
have stated that there is "natural tendency" to award attorney's
fees because this sanction is specifically provided for in Rule 11.2 52
However, if Rule 11 becomes a tool for fee-shifting, an avalanche
of satellite litigation will result, as the winners in litigation attempt
to recover their expenses.2 53 A trial court may consider imposing
alternative sanctions2 54 to accomplish purposes of the rule. A repri-
mand, mandatory legal education or fees paid to the court, rather
than attorney's fees, could serve as deterrents to misconduct.2 55
Furthermore, an alternative sanction may discourage routine fil-
ings of Rule 11 for the opportunity to recover legal fees.25 An ap-
pellate court may insure that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding sanctions.2 57 The reviewing court should
encourage the trial court, by a thorough deferential review, to
thoughtfully explain the choice of sanction and how it was appro-
246. Id.
247. See Id.
248. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
249. Vairo, supra note 3, at 231.
250. Id.
251. Comment, supra note 47, at 564.
252. Vairo, supra note 3, at 230.
253. Id. at 231.
254. Comment, supra note 1, at 109. In one case, Judge Scwartzer, who is a
proponent of alternative sanctions, ordered an attorney to show cause to the court
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for a Rule 11 violation.
Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
255. Comment, supra note 1, at 109.
256. Id.
257. See Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 936..
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priate under the facts before it.256
CONCLUSION
Rule 11 is a necessity in modern litigation and therefore
should not be repealed. 59 However, courts must define the bound-
aries of the rule to foster its purposes.260 Excessive satellite litiga-
tion, stimulated by a de novo review and the award of attorney's
fees, may serve to offset the positive effects of the rule.261 Courts,
acting through Rule 11, have encouraged attorneys to "stop and
think" before acting unreasonably." 2 However, courts must insist
that attorneys not misuse the very rule intended to curb litigation
abuse.263
North Carolina courts have the power to deal with litigation
abuse through N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a).26 4 Because Rule
11 has succeeded at raising the consciousness of attorneys, the rule
should not be allowed to become "a new toy for lawyers. ' 265 North
Carolina's adoption of a de novo appellate review of Rule 11 deci-
sions in Turner may well lead to Professor Miller's nightmare. 66
The nightmare occurs as "the vindicated party leaps up and ex-
claims, 'I hereby move to sanction the sanction motion' ",267
T. June Hobby
258. Untereiner, supra note 2, at 921.
259. Scwartzer, supra note 87, at 1018.
260. Comment, supra note 1, at 574
261. See Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 935.
262. Schwartzer, supra note 87, at 1021.
263. Id. at 1013.
264. See supra note 89 (text of N.C. GEN STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a)(Cum.
Supp. 1989).
265. Comment, supra note 1, at 119.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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